Defending Your Client\u27s Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator by Gilson, Blake
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 3 Article 14 
December 2011 
Defending Your Client's Property Rights in Space: A Practical 
Guide for the Lunar Litigator 
Blake Gilson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Blake Gilson, Defending Your Client's Property Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 
80 Fordham L. Rev. 1367 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss3/14 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 1367 
DEFENDING YOUR CLIENT’S PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN SPACE:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
THE LUNAR LITIGATOR 
Blake Gilson*
 
 
Are there property rights on the moon?  Specifically, if a private person 
takes possession of property on the moon, whether real estate or removable 
resources, does he have a legally cognizable claim?  How would he enforce 
such a claim in practice?  The language of the treaty governing such 
matters, the Outer Space Treaty, leaves the question ambiguous.  While the 
Treaty prohibits national claims to sovereignty over lunar territory, 
whether this rule restricts private ownership claims is an open question. 
Though much has been written on normative questions of the best legal 
regime for regulating property in outer space and on celestial bodies, the 
positive question of the current status of such rights has been neglected.  
While elaborating a new framework for what is currently viewed as an 
unworkable regime, scholars have only superficially addressed the issue of 
the existence and enforceability of property rights on the moon. 
This Note attempts to remedy this gap in the scholarship by examining 
three legal doctrines—property law, international law, and space law—in 
order to provide a snapshot of the current state of the law governing 
property rights on celestial bodies such as the moon.  This Note argues that 
the framework for litigating legal ownership in space lie at the nexus of 
these three bodies of doctrine. 
The goal of this Note is to provide a toolbox for future litigators.  A clear 
picture of current law governing property rights on celestial bodies will 
help to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the existing legal framework and 
thereby provide a better grounding for future policy conversations.  This 
Note attempts to create this clear picture by describing and analyzing three 
types of property disputes that might arise in outer space and how they each 
might be litigated if they arose tomorrow. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a day in the not-too-distant future when private mining 
companies are trying to extract valuable minerals from the moon.  Mining 
requires water1 and, since water on the moon is concentrated in certain 
spots,2 the space available for profitable mining is limited.  Imagine that 
Company A has no right to own any land or minerals on the moon.  
Imagine further that Company B, a sort of corporate hyena, keeps an eye on 
companies like A, and swoops in to extract the minerals ahead of A when A 
finds a prime site for extraction.3  Company A will have to expend great 
effort and financial resources to locate and extract the minerals.  Will A also 
have to spend money on guards and weaponry to defend its stake from 
companies like B?  Without the right to own the property, A may have no 
choice but to take such security measures.  Given the added expense of the 
defensive muscle, the whole venture may not be economically feasible.4
The Outer Space Treaty
  
This scenario may sound like science fiction, a “problem” fit only for after-
dinner conversation, but these dilemmas may emerge sooner than one might 
think. 
5 was signed in the late 1960s, in the context of 
the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union.6  The main 
concerns addressed by the treaty were the prevention of the use of outer 
space and celestial bodies as bases for military infrastructure by one of the 
superpowers, and the prevention of military conflict over possession of 
outer space and celestial bodies.7
As the Outer Space Treaty enters its forty-second year, the 
circumstances, concerns, and interests involved in the occupation and use of 
lunar territory have changed.
 
8
 
 1. See National Handbook of Recommended Methods for Water Data Acquisition, 
PUBL’NS OF THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ch. 11.G, http://pubs.usgs.gov/chapter11/
chapter11G.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).  If any human workers were needed onsite, 
they would obviously require water as well.  Not having to carry water to the moon would 
reduce the expense and increase the commercial viability of mining endeavors. Ned Potter, 
Water on the Moon:  A Billion Gallons, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/water-moon-nasa-impact-probe/story?id=11939079 (“Water, essential for 
human survival, would be heavy and expensive for spacecraft to bring from earth.”). 
  While preventing the militarization of space 
 2. See Studies Show More Evidence of Water on Moon, Mars, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2010, 
4:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/12/us-mars-water-idUSTRE63B5MT201
00412. 
 3. A prime site for extraction would be one containing valuable resources and near a 
water source. 
 4. For a new theory of property based on considerations of costs saved by having 
enforceable property rights, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of 
Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 538 (2005) (proposing a theory that property law “is 
organized around creating and defending the value inherent in stable ownership”). 
 5. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 
610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 6. See The Outer Space Treaty at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/outerspace (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 7. See id. 
 8. Compare Alan Wasser & Douglas Jobes, Space Settlements, Property Rights, and 
International Law:  Could a Lunar Settlement Claim the Lunar Real Estate It Needs to 
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is still an active concern,9 the commercial and economic potential of space 
travel and lunar development have become equally pressing.10  China, 
India, the United States, and Russia have all announced plans to build 
permanent lunar bases.11  The moon is now known to contain significant 
amounts of helium-3 (He-3), which is believed to be an ideal fuel for 
producing energy by nuclear fusion.12
Privately funded space travel has been a reality since 2004.
 
13  Various 
private companies are engaged in a race to develop the space tourism 
industry.14  Successful companies will lower the cost of getting to space, 
just as the cost of air travel decreased after its origin in the early twentieth 
century.15  Meanwhile, United States policy has moved toward facilitating 
the commercial development of space.  Congress passed the Commercial 
Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004,16 the purpose of which is to 
“promote the development of the emerging commercial human space flight 
industry.”17
Given all of these developments, the question of whether private parties 
may claim lunar property rights will likely become a live issue within the 
lifetimes of those reading this Note.  Whether it is a hotel on the moon
 
18
 
Survive?, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 37, 59 (2008) (quoting space lawyer Ogunsola Ogunbanwo’s 
statement that the Treaty addressed concerns that were current at the time of enactment), 
with Richard B. Bilder, A Legal Regime for the Mining of Helium-3 on the Moon:  U.S. 
Policy Options, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 243, 277–80 (2010) (arguing that the United States 
needs to change the current international legal regime to make lunar resource exploitation 
more practicable). 
 or 
 9. See ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, supra note 6. 
 10. See, e.g., Bill Carswell, The Outer Space and Moon Treaties and the Coming Moon 
Rush, SPACE DAILY (Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.spacewar.com/news/oped-02c.html 
(describing China’s space program and predicting a new “space race” around economic 
growth through development of space resources, rather than military expansion). 
 11. China Aims for Lunar Base After 2020, MOON DAILY (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://www.moondaily.com/reports/China_aims_for_lunar_base_after_2020_999.html; 
International Space Race to Mine the Moon for Nuclear Fuel Underway, WORLD TIME NEWS 
REP. (July 12, 2009), http://www.wtnrradio.com/story.php?story=366. 
 12. See Bilder, supra note 8, at 246–47 (observing that He-3 is incredibly rich in energy, 
as well as “safe and non-polluting”); Mark Williams, Mining the Moon, TECH. REV. (Aug. 
23, 2007), http://www.technologyreview.com/Energy/19296/. 
 13. John Schwartz, Manned Private Craft Reaches Space in a Milestone for Flight, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A1. 
 14. See, e.g., VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/ (last visited Nov. 16, 
2011); see also Louisa Hearn, Space Race to Take Tourists out of This World, SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/space-race-
to-take-tourists-out-of-this-world-20100921-15kuw.html. 
 15. See Hearn, supra note 14 (“Space tourism . . . is a bit like the way aviation started 
last century.  It began with a few magnificent men in their flying machines and slowly got to 
where we are today.”). 
 16. 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101–70121 (2006). 
 17. Press Release, House Comm. on Sci., Space Bill Rockets Toward Congressional 
Approval (Mar. 4, 2004), quoted in Commercialization of Space:  Commercial Space 
Launch Amendments Act of 2004, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 619 (2004) [hereinafter 
Commercial Space]. 
 18. Cf. Stuart McDill, Space Hotel Says It’s on Schedule to Open in 2012, REUTERS 
(Nov. 2, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A151N20091102; 
Jeremy Hsu, Space Hotel Pioneer Bigelow Envisions Inflatable Moon Bases, POPSCI (Apr. 
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a mining expedition there,19
It would be advisable to sort out the complex theoretical and practical 
legal issues so that wise and thoughtful policy decisions can be made when 
the time comes.  This Note will sort out those legal issues by examining 
three prototypical property disputes, and how a litigator might approach 
them under the current state of the law.  The first type of dispute involves 
trespass, as in our Company A/Company B hypothetical.
 private investors will expect and require some 
level of protection of their right to the property on which they operate their 
businesses. 
20  The second 
type is an unlawful ouster, where an intruder company occupies land 
purportedly owned by another company so that the claimed owner cannot 
use it at all.  For example, Company D marks an area of the moon with a 
fence and perhaps machinery and personnel, and Company E removes 
Company D’s machinery and occupies the land with its own machinery and 
personnel.21  The third type of dispute involves nuisance, which could 
occur where neighboring land is being used in a way that interferes with a 
purported owner’s use of his land.  For example, Company X is extracting 
water from its land, and Company Y, on neighboring land, is digging a hole 
that causes the ground to shift, making Company X’s job more difficult.22
Part I of this Note lays out the historical and legal background of the 
problem.  Part I.A.1 discusses what is meant by a “property right” and 
examines two theories of property current in legal scholarship.  Since an 
action to defend a lunar property right could be brought in any country, Part 
I.A.2 compares property rights in the world’s two dominant legal traditions, 
civil and common law.  Part I.B first discusses the development of space 
law beginning with the relevant treaties.  It then considers U.S. statutes 
affecting space, and executive policy with respect to space in different 
countries.  Part I.C explores possible ways that lunar property rights might 
reach adjudication, and the legal principles and rules of decision that would 
apply.  Finally, Part I.D outlines the legal regimes governing property in 
Antarctica and the deep seabed.  These two situations offer useful analogies 
to the international legal regime that governs outer space. 
 
Part II discusses the conflicting interpretations of the Outer Space 
Treaty’s non-appropriation clause.  Part II.A examines conflicting 
interpretations of the plain language of the clause.  Part II.B examines the 
disagreement over whether countries violate international law merely by 
recognizing or recording private property claims in outer space.  Part II.C 
outlines differing opinions on whether the “common heritage of mankind” 
doctrine applies to the moon, thereby ruling out private ownership. 
 
15, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-04/space-hotel-
pioneer-envisions-inflatable-moon-bases. 
 19. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 20. The remedy for this type of property violation is called trespass. See infra notes 66, 
69 and accompanying text. 
 21. The remedy for this type of property violation is called ejectment. See infra notes 
65–67 and accompanying text. 
 22. The remedy for this type of property violation is called nuisance. See infra notes 72–
73 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, Part III makes predictions as to the likely outcome of litigation 
over lunar property claims in a variety of forums.  Part III then suggests an 
international regime whose purpose would be to make the status of lunar 
property more settled and less ambiguous. 
I.  THE ELEMENTS OF PROPERTY 
Part I.A of this Note attempts to ground the discussion in two commonly 
accepted definitions of the term “property,” and to see how those 
definitions fit into the world’s two dominant legal traditions, the civil 
tradition and the common law tradition.  Part I.B describes the international 
laws, and some of the national laws and policies within the framework of 
which property in space must be examined.  Part I.C discusses which courts 
would adjudicate a lunar property dispute, what law would apply, and what 
policy concerns would form the basis for any adjudication.  Part I.D 
examines the international legal regimes governing Antarctica and the deep 
seabed as analogous to lunar property. 
A.  What Is Property? 
This section considers some basic questions of property law.  Namely, 
what is a plaintiff asking a court to do in determining that property rights 
are present?  Since property is a legal construct,23
1.  A Right Is a Remedy 
 a rule or set of rules is 
necessary and sufficient to give rise to what is recognizable as property.  
Part I.A.1 of this Note will suggest a broad theoretical basis for what would 
constitute such a set of rules, and Part I.A.2 will discuss how to orient that 
set of rules in the common law and civil law contexts. 
It is a maxim of both law and equity that “where there is a right, there is a 
remedy.”24  That is, if one has a “right” to something, the legal machinery 
of courts and judges must be able to enforce that right.25  This maxim holds 
up well under the examination of common sense.  After all, what would it 
mean to have a right which, were it violated, would leave the right-holder 
without any action that could be taken through the legal system to force the 
violator to respect the right?26  A “right” in such a situation would be 
meaningless; it would amount to nothing at all.27
 
 23. As English philosopher David Hume suggests, property arises artificially from law, 
not from nature. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 528–29 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1888) (1739–40).  This view was endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) (“[N]ot all economic interests [in land] 
are ‘property rights’; only those . . . which have the law back of them . . . .”). 
  A right is in fact 
 24. HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS 46–47 (1845) (“[I]t is a vain 
thing to imagine a right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are 
reciprocal.”).  The original is “[u]bi jus, ibi remedium.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1876 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 25. See BROOM, supra note 24, at 47. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. 
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“logically identical” to the remedy available to enforce it;28
Rights in property are notoriously difficult to define;
 a right and its 
remedy are one and the same. 
29 a wide variety of 
historical and political connotations accompany the word “property.”30  
However, among legal scholars, there are two widely accepted approaches 
for defining property rights.31  These are the “bundle of rights approach”32
Under the bundle of rights approach, the set of rules that constitute 
property in a thing secures a collection, or bundle, of rights with respect to 
that thing as against other persons.
 
and the “right to exclude” approach. 
33  That is, the law holds in reserve a 
bundle of remedies, in case anyone should violate one of the rights an 
owner holds with respect to a piece of his property.34  The three main rights 
assumed to be in the full bundle of property rights are the rights to exclude, 
to use, and to dispose of the property.35  These rights are seen as equally 
dispensable, so that they can be individually added to or subtracted from the 
bundle at will.36
The alternative approach—right to exclude—to defining property is 
similar, but holds that the bundle of rights approach “falls short as it does 
not indicate what part of a bundle of separable rights . . . is the necessary 
minimum to constitute property, implying that the word may have no 
common convention and may thus be meaningless.”
 
37  This camp argues 
that the right to exclude is the core, indispensable minimum right that 
constitutes property.38  This exclusion school of thought further argues that 
“the positive ‘bundle’ of rights like possession, use, and alienation can all 
be derived from the negative exclusionary right.”39
 
 28. Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:  Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 255, 255–56 (1961). 
 
 29. See O. Lee Reed, What Is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS L.J. 459, 459–60 & nn.5–9 
(2004). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
4–6 (2010). 
 32. See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, RAYMOND R. COLETTA & M.C. MIROW, GLOBAL 
ISSUES IN PROPERTY LAW 24 (2006); Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 2 (1990). 
 33. Epstein, supra note 32, at 3. 
 34. See infra Part I.A.2.b; see also supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Epstein, supra note 32, at 3–4. 
 36. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 NOMOS:  PROPERTY 69 
(1980).  For example, a lease could be seen as an arrangement whereby a tenant acquires 
from a landlord the rights to use and to exclude others (including the landlord) from the 
property, while the landlord retains the right to dispose of the property by, for instance, 
selling it. 
 37. Reed, supra note 29, at 459. 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 473; see also id. at 487 (“At the very heart of property lies its singular 
conceptual core, which is the private right of exclusion.”). 
 39. Id. at 488.  The exclusion right is “negative” in the sense that it puts a duty on others 
not to do something, namely not to interfere with the owner’s property. See id. at 490–91.  
The other rights mentioned are “positive” in the sense that they allow an owner to do certain 
things with respect to the property. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right 
to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998). 
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Both camps agree that the right to exclude others from one’s property is 
at least sufficient for the purpose of having rights in that property.40  The 
camps differ in that the exclusionary school considers the exclusionary right 
necessary as well as sufficient, while the “bundle” school holds the 
exclusionary right unnecessary.  Other rights which the “bundle” school 
considers equally sufficient include the rights to use the property and to 
dispose of or “alienate” it.41
2.  When in Rome:  How Property Is Conceived and Protected 
in Different Jurisdictions 
  The next subsection examines how these 
individual rights are treated and defended in the common law and civil law 
traditions. 
There are two globally influential legal traditions, the civil and common 
law traditions.42  While the common law tradition is the basis of law in 
England, the United States, and most of the former British Empire,43 the 
civil law tradition, originating in Roman law,44 has informed the legal 
systems of countries throughout the world.45  Because the law of property is 
a central concept of civil law handed down from the Roman models,46 it is 
likely to be similar in all civil law countries,47 despite the separate 
evolution of laws in those countries.48  Civil law is generally code-based, 
with each nation having its own code, or set of written laws.49
 
 40. Compare Epstein, supra note 
  The civil 
32, at 3 (noting that the right to exclude is equivalent 
to the right to possess, and that the latter is part of the “standard definition” of property), 
with Reed, supra note 29, at 491 (“[P]roperty is an exclusionary right . . . .”). 
 41. “Alienate” is defined as “[t]o transfer or convey . . . to another.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 84.  In other words, alienate means to voluntarily relinquish 
all of one’s rights in a thing and grant those same rights to another person. See MERRILL & 
SMITH, supra note 31, at 5 (comparing the view that, while exclusion can “be supplemented 
with additional rights and privileges,” the right to exclude others “forms the core of the 
concept of property itself” with the view that “[n]o particular [right] in the bundle—
including the right to exclude—is privileged, and the measure of which bundles are preferred 
to which others is simply a matter of social policy”). 
 42. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 
14–15 (2d ed. 1999) (identifying the common law and civil law traditions as “the two major 
legal traditions in the modern Western world”). 
 43. Id. at 170. 
 44. Id. at 44. 
 45. In particular, Roman law formed the basis for the French and German civil codes, 
while the French and German codes in turn formed the basis for law codes throughout the 
world. Id. at 44–45.  The French code formed the basis for the civil codes of several 
European countries, including Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the civil codes of 
Latin American countries, as well as the codes of countries formerly part of the French 
colonial empire. Id.  The German Civil Code was influential in the development of the law 
codes of eastern European nations, as well as Greece, Italy, Japan, and Korea. Id. at 46–47. 
 46. Id. at 51 (“All the major civil codes deal with a body of substantive law . . . still 
similar in important respects to, Justinian’s Institutes:  [including] property . . . .”). 
Justinian’s Institutes constitute a part of the civil tradition’s founding body of written law, 
the Corpus Juris Civilis. Id. at 18–19. 
 47. Id. at 51 (explaining that the influence of Justinian’s Institutes “still links the civil 
law systems as they move further and further from their common historical roots”). 
 48. See supra note 45. 
 49. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 31. 
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tradition lacks the common law rule of precedent, which requires judges to 
follow previous decisions as binding law.50
a.  Civil Law Property Protection 
 
The civil law tradition is the basis of law in much of the world, including 
the majority of Europe and some African, Asian, and South American 
countries.51
The civil tradition provides a range of “possessory actions.”
   
52  The civil 
law traditionally views property as an indivisible phenomenon of 
“ownership” with respect to a thing.53  Once a court finds that an individual 
is an “owner,” that individual has the rights to possess, to use, and to 
dispose of the property.54  These rights are protected through in rem 
actions55 against any person “who makes [an owner’s exercise of their 
rights] impossible.”56  Also relevant to the discussion here is the deep 
rooted tradition that possession of something unclaimed establishes 
ownership in the civil law tradition.57  Civil law conceptualizes property as 
based in natural law,58 which may allow the recognition of property rights 
even without territorial sovereignty.59
In France, the action of reintegrande is used to eject a person who has 
ousted the owner from possession of the property.
 
60  The complainte can 
also be used to eject a person attempting to oust the owner from possession 
if the owner has been in possession for at least a year, and the owner’s 
possession is “continuous, peaceful, public and unequivocal.”61
In Germany, an owner can bring a “possessory action” whenever another 
“interfere[s] with possession” or causes a “disturbance of possession.”
 
62
 
 50. Id. at 263 (comparing the civil law tradition, where precedent “is often noted . . . as 
teaching something,” with the common law tradition, where precedent “exists separately as 
law to be followed”). 
  
 51. See supra note 45. 
 52. “Possessory actions” are legal devices used in the civil law system to recover 
possession of property. K.W. RYAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CIVIL LAW 153 (1962). 
 53. See JIANFU CHEN, FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORISATION TO PRIVATE LAW 138 
(1995). 
 54. Id. 
 55. In rem actions are actions with respect to a physical object. Id. at 137. 
 56. Id. 
 57. In ancient Roman law, occupatio was the “acquisition of ownership by . . . taking 
possession of that which has no owner, and with the intention of keeping it as one’s own.” 
George Long, Occupatio, in JOHN MURRAY, A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN 
ANTIQUITIES 260 (1875), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/
Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Occupatio.html.  Currently, long-term possession can 
sometimes “ripen” into ownership. See CHEN, supra note 53, at 138. 
 58. See UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 14–18 (2000). 
 59. Wayne White, The Legal Regime for Private Activities in Outer Space, in SPACE:  
THE FREE-MARKET FRONTIER 83, 96 (2002). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 153–54. 
 62. Id. at 154–55. 
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This action would seem to protect both the rights of exclusion and use.63  
More generally, civil law jurisdictions protect possession and exclusion 
rights through possessory actions, and protect use (i.e., not being disturbed 
in the use and enjoyment of one’s own land) through “proprietary 
actions.”64
b.  Common Law Property Protection 
 
At common law, the right to exclude others from one’s property is 
enforced through the actions of ejectment65 and trespass66.  Ejectment 
requires a showing that the defendant is in possession of all or part of the 
land to which the plaintiff has a right to possession.67  This is the Company 
D/Company E hypothetical.68  Trespass is an action for damages for either 
unlawful entry by a defendant onto the plaintiff’s land, or any unlawful 
interference with the plaintiff’s right to exclude others from the land.69  
This is the Company A/Company B hypothetical.70  In either case, at 
common law the plaintiff need only show a claim to the land superior to the 
defendant, not an absolute claim to title.71
To enforce the right to use, both the common law and equity provide 
remedies to punish or prevent the tort of nuisance.
  The actions of trespass and 
ejectment protect the right to exclude. 
72  Nuisance law protects 
an owner from uses of neighboring land which “unreasonably interfere” 
with the owner’s use of his land.73  This is the Company X/Company Y 
hypothetical.74  A person who is found to create a nuisance can be liable for 
damages to neighboring landowners harmed by the nuisance, or can be 
enjoined to terminate the nuisance on pain of contempt.75
The right to alienate one’s property is not protected by any particular 
action; instead, it is enforced by the law of contract.
 
76
 
 63. Id. at 155 (“First, there exists . . . a claim for recovery of possession by one who has 
been deprived of direct possession . . . [by] a possessor in defective possession.  
Secondly . . . a possessor has a claim based on disturbance of possession for removal of the 
disturbance and an injunction against further disturbance.”).  The common law protections of 
the rights to exclude and to use property through trespass, ejectment, and nuisance, see infra 
Part I.A.2.b, provide a useful comparison to these civil law doctrines. 
  After property has 
 64. MATTEI, supra note 58, at 173–75. 
 65. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Ejectment § 1 (2010). 
 66. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
 67. Id. §§ 1, 19. 
 68. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 69. See 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 1 (2010). 
 70. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 71. RYAN, supra note 52, at 156–57. 
 72. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 31, at 193 (“Nuisance differs from trespass in that 
nuisance protects use and enjoyment rather than possession.”). 
 73. R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 845 (2d ed. 2006). 
 74. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 75. FREYERMUTH, supra note 73, at 844–45. 
 76. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 31, at 91 (noting that “the policy of the law is to 
promote alienability,” and that “[t]otal restraints on alienation . . . are always struck down as 
violating this [public] policy”). See generally id. at 159–66 (discussing methods of enforcing 
an agreed transfer of property). 
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been transferred, the laws of trespass, ejectment, or nuisance are at the new 
owner’s disposal.77
B.  Laws in Space:  Treaties, Statutes, and Policy 
 
This section examines the laws that affect and regulate human activities 
in space and with respect to celestial bodies such as the moon, focusing on 
the acquisition of property.  Part I.B.1 discusses the treaties that together 
constitute the international space law framework.  Part I.B.2 discusses U.S. 
space law and its encouragement of private commercial development of 
space resources.  Part I.B.3 then discusses United States commercial space 
law policy and how space commercialization policy differs throughout the 
world. 
1.  The International Treaty Regime 
There are five international treaties relevant to human activities in space:  
the Outer Space Treaty; the Agreement Governing the Activities of States 
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies78 (Moon Agreement); the 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the 
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space79 (Rescue Agreement); the 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects80 (Liability Convention); and the Convention on Registration of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space81 (Registration Convention).  All of 
these treaties are widely accepted by the space-faring nations and most of 
the world except for the Moon Agreement, which is widely viewed as a 
failure.82  Only thirteen countries have both signed and ratified it,83 and 
none of these countries have ever sent anyone into space.84
 
 77. Id. at 1–3 (noting that subsequent to transfer, the transferee becomes the “owner,” 
and that nuisance and trespass are among the remedies available to an owner). 
 
 78. Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. 
 79. Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement] (entered into force 
Dec. 3, 1968). 
 80. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (entered into force 
with respect to the United States Oct. 9, 1973). 
 81. Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention] (entered into 
force Sept. 15, 1976). 
 82. Sarah Coffey, Establishing a Legal Framework for Property Rights to Natural 
Resources in Outer Space, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 119, 127 (2009); see also Henry R. 
Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into the Commercial World:  
Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 97 (2005) (“[I]t is highly unlikely 
that the major space faring nations will ever agree to a Common Heritage agreement for the 
moon.”); id. at 85–86 (noting that “[t]he Moon Agreement . . . declar[es] the moon to be the 
common heritage of mankind,” and that “[f]uture enforcement of the Moon Agreement’s 
common heritage provisions obviously remains questionable”); Rosanna Sattler, 
Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights:  From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 23, 30 (2005); Lynn Fountain, Note, Creating Momentum in Space:  Ending the 
Paralysis Produced by the “Common Heritage of Mankind” Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
1753, 1763–64 (2003). 
 83. Four countries have signed the treaty but not ratified it. See Coffey, supra note 82, at 
127–28 & n.57.  Ratification and signature are different ways a country may show intent to 
be bound by a treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 11, May 23, 1969, 1155 
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The Outer Space Treaty establishes that “the moon and other celestial 
bodies [are] not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, 
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”85  Whether this 
clause prohibits private individuals from claiming property in lunar land or 
resources is the subject of dispute.86  The Moon Agreement, however, 
unequivocally rules out private ownership on the moon.87  Rights to exploit 
lunar resources would be apportioned by an international body88 which 
does not currently exist.89
Nations party
 
90 to the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention 
are liable for damages caused by people or objects launched into space from 
their territory.91  Under the Liability Convention, Country A can claim 
money damages from Country B, where persons or equipment launched 
into space from B caused “damage” to persons of A.92  The Outer Space 
Treaty likewise provides for liability of one nation to another when persons 
or objects launched from the former “damage” the persons of the latter, 
including when such damage takes place on “the moon or other celestial 
bodies.”93  The Registration Convention requires a country from whose 
territory any objects are launched to maintain a registry of such objects.94
 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  Signature requires only that a representative 
of the country sign the treaty, while ratification is “confirmation and acceptance of a 
previous act, thereby making the act valid . . . .  [For example,] action taken by a legislature 
to make binding a treaty negotiated by the executive [is ratification].” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 
  
The registering nation must inform the United Nations Secretary-General of 
24, at 1376. 
 84. Coffey, supra note 82, at 127–28 & n.57. 
 85. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II. 
 86. See infra Part II. 
 87. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at arts. 11(1), 11(3) (stating that the moon is the 
“common heritage of mankind” and that “[no] part thereof or natural resources in place, shall 
become property of any . . . non-governmental entity or of any natural person”). 
 88. Id. at art. 11(5). 
 89. Cf. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards a New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space 
Mineral Resources, 88 NEB. L. REV. 794, 813–14 (2010). 
 90. When a country becomes a party to a treaty, it agrees to abide by the treaty as law. 
See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 2 (“[A party] means a State which has 
consented to be bound by the treaty . . . .”).  The U.S. Constitution provides that treaties to 
which the United States is a party become U.S. law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).  
For a discussion on the enforceability of treaties as U.S. law, see Leonie W. Huang, Note, 
Which Treaties Reign Supreme?  The Dormant Supremacy Clause Effect of Implemented 
Non-self-executing Treaties, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2211 (2011).  
 91. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VI; Liability Convention, supra note 80, at 
art. VIII(1).  Note that the space law treaties all refer to the “launching states” of a party 
doing damage, rather than the home country of the party.  The “jurisdiction and control,” id. 
at art. VIII, that a state maintains over a party in outer space is in the state from which the 
party launched, regardless of his citizenship.  
 92. Liability Convention, supra note 80, at art. VIII(1) (“A State which suffers damage, 
or whose natural or juridical persons suffer damage, may present to a launching State a claim 
for compensation for such damage.”). 
 93. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VII. 
 94. Registration Convention, supra note 81, at art. II(1). 
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any launch, along with data about each launch.95  The Secretary-General in 
turn enters that information in a Register that is freely accessible to all.96  
The country from which a party launches people or objects into outer space 
retains “jurisdiction and control” over that party according to the Outer 
Space Treaty.97
2.  U.S. Statutes:  Moving Towards Commercialization 
 
U.S. space policy started as an outgrowth of the Cold War.98  After the 
Soviet Union successfully launched the first artificial orbital satellite, 
Sputnik, the U.S. became determined to win the space race.99  After the 
moon landing in 1969, the U.S. government provided NASA with a 
renewed mission by charging it with advancing commercial activity in 
space.100  By the early 1980s, NASA was relying on contracts with private 
companies to provide it with the technology and services needed to carry 
out the scientific exploration of space.101  President Reagan, believing the 
private sector to be more efficient than the public sector, allowed the private 
sector to conduct government activities such as supplying NASA’s 
technology needs.102  Congress endorsed and furthered the drive to 
commercialize space103 in 1984.  It amended the appropriations bill that 
funded the space program to provide that “[t]he general welfare of the 
United States of America requires that [NASA] seek and encourage, to the 
maximum extent possible, the fullest commercial use of space.”104  That 
same year, Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Act105 (Launch 
Act), which made the Department of Transportation responsible for 
regulating the space industry.106
 
 95. Id. at art. IV. 
 
 96. Id. at art. III. 
 97. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII. 
 98. Roger D. Launius, Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age, NASA, 
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/sputnik/sputorig.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2011). 
 99. Commercial Space, supra note 17, at 621. See generally Sputnik and the Dawn of the 
Space Age, NASA, http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/sputnik (last visited Nov. 16, 
2011). 
 100. Commercial Space, supra note 17, at 622. 
 101. See Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting:  The Evolution of 
U.S. National Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
405, 410 (2010). 
 102. Id. 
 103. In this Note, the term “commercialization of space” is understood to mean the 
replacement of the government by commercial ventures in activities such as space travel, 
exploration, and the exploitation of space resources.  More generally, it is also understood to 
imply a shift from the study and exploration of space to making a profit from activities in 
space. 
 104. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1985 § 110, Pub. 
L. No. 98-361, 98 Stat. 422, 426 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2451(c) (2006)). 
 105. Commercial Space Launch Act § 3, Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (1994) 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 70101(b) (2006)). 
 106. Id. 
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The commercialization of space was further advanced in 2004, when 
Congress passed the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 
2004107 (Amendments Act).  The Amendments Act “authorizes private and 
commercial passengers to engage in space travel and establishes the 
licensing of private sector spacecraft to bring paying passengers on 
suborbital flights.”108  Space law scholar Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz 
believes that, since Congress has always granted power to the Department 
of Transportation to license private spaceflight, it is “reasonable to expect 
that [Congress] will grant [the Department of Transportation] orbital 
licensing jurisdiction in the future.”109
3.  Industrial Policy Versus the Free Market:  Differing Views 
of Government Involvement in Commercial Enterprise 
 
The United States has historically viewed commercial activities as 
inherently the domain of the private sector,110 including those in space.111  
The European view, however, has been that the space industry is by nature 
an exercise in “industrial policy.”112  Industrial policy is seen by European 
nations as “a cooperative effort between government and industry to 
promote the national interest.”113  In other words, the boundary between 
what is private activity in space, and what is government activity in space 
may be seen differently in the United States as opposed to other nations.  As 
Gabrynowicz explains, the “U.S. government supplies and funds critical 
space infrastructure and provides exclusive contracts to U.S. aerospace 
companies.”114
C.  How Do We Enforce?  The Procedural Posture of Claims 
 
This section examines the legal issues relevant to bringing a lunar 
property claim.  Part I.C.1 discusses the applicable law.  Part I.C.2 
discusses the relevant policy issues. 
 
 107. Pub. L. No. 108-492, 118 Stat. 3974 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101–70121). 
 108. Gabrynowicz, supra note 101, at 413. 
 109. Id. at 421.  “[O]rbital licensing jurisdiction” means the power to license private 
orbital space flights. Id.; see also April Greene Apking, Note, The Rush To Develop Space:  
The Role of Spacefaring Nations in Forging Environmental Standards for the Use of 
Celestial Bodies for Governmental and Private Interests, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 429, 456–57 (2005) (laying out the federal regulations and licensing requirements for 
private spaceflight).  This regulatory adjustment is significant because it reveals a trend in 
the executive branch toward helping companies exploit space’s commercial possibilities.  
 110. Gabrynowicz, supra note 101, at 424. 
 111. See Commercial Space, supra note 17, at 619 (noting the United States’ Commercial 
Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 was “designed to promote the development of the 
emerging commercial human space flight industry”); id. (explaining that the Act would 
allow “the private sector to challenge the hegemony of [NASA] in space”). 
 112. Gabrynowicz, supra note 101, at 424. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (describing the argument that the U.S. government supports space activity by 
private U.S. companies as the “standing European response” to U.S. aerospace companies’ 
complaints that they have to compete “with commercial activities conducted by [European] 
governments”). 
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1.  What Law Applies? 
a.  Applicable Tribunals 
In the United States, property is a common law area,115 and thus courts 
of general jurisdiction,116 such as state courts,117 likely will hear lunar 
property claims.118  As noted above, the Outer Space Treaty provides that 
nations retain legal authority over persons and equipment launched into 
space from their territory.119  Assuming an action to enforce a property 
right was brought in the country from which the defendant launched, a 
tribunal there has jurisdiction over the matter.120
The International Court of Justice
 
121 (ICJ) has jurisdiction over claims 
arising out of treaty obligations.122  If a launching state refuses to enforce 
property rights against the defendant, the plaintiff can appeal to the ICJ for 
the launching state’s failure to uphold the space treaties.123
 
 115. See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 31, at 1 (“[T]he common law is typically 
divided into contracts, torts, and property.”). 
  However, a 
plaintiff can only bring suit in the ICJ by convincing his country to bring 
 116. Courts of general jurisdiction are courts “having unlimited or nearly unlimited trial 
jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 
406.  Jurisdiction is “a court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree.” Id. at 927. 
 117. See, e.g., Frontera Res. Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 
582 F.3d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Unlike state courts, which are courts of general 
jurisdiction, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . .” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 118. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“[E]very State possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”). 
 119. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII (“A State Party to the Treaty on whose 
registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control 
over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial 
body.”).  The jurisdiction assigned by the Outer Space Treaty combines the internationally 
recognized jurisdiction of courts over “a ship, aircraft, or other vehicle . . . registered under 
the laws” of the country with jurisdiction over “nationals.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421 (1987).  Note, however, that the 
defendant is not necessarily a national of the country from which he launched, so the treaty 
language does not fit perfectly into the Restatement’s rule. 
 120. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII.  This assertion holds as long as any 
internal rules of jurisdiction (which would depend on the country) are satisfied.  In civil law 
jurisdictions, property disputes would be handled in “ordinary courts.” GLENDON ET AL., 
supra note 42, at 66 (“The jurisdiction of the ordinary courts typically is limited to criminal 
law and private law disputes.”); id. at 112–13 (noting that non-commercial “private law” 
includes property law).  Civil law courts traditionally only have jurisdiction over property 
located within the territory of the court’s country. Cf. id. 
 121. The ICJ is a court created by the United Nations to hear disputes arising out of 
international law. See generally INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 122. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 123. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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the suit on his behalf against the country of the defendant.124  The ICJ only 
has the power to adjudicate when both countries submit to jurisdiction.125
b.  Law of Treaty Interpretation 
 
Under international law, treaties are to be given their literal meanings if 
possible.126  As the U.S. Supreme Court has written, “The clear import of 
the treaty language controls unless ‘application of the words of the treaty 
according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the 
intent or expectations of its signatories.’”127  Most other countries follow 
this rule of treaty interpretation, which has been codified in the Vienna 
Convention.128
c.  Laws and Doctrines of Property 
 
In addition to considering treaties, courts would also apply their 
countries’ own property laws.  In doing so, courts will likely rely on a 
background theoretical understanding of property peculiar to their legal 
traditions.129  Different countries’ laws on whether and to what extent 
private persons may own land vary widely.130
The ICJ would apply international property law.
 
131  To determine the 
relevant international law, the ICJ would consider treaties, customary 
international law, and “general principles of law.”132
A tribunal considering a question of international law also relies on 
customary international law.
   
133  Customary international law, which is 
extrapolated from the existing practice of nations.134 constitutes binding 
law in U.S. courts135
 
 124. ICJ Statute, supra note 
 unless Congress has explicitly legislated to the 
122, at art. 34(1) (“Only states may be parties in cases before 
the Court.”). 
 125. Id. at art. 36(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all case which the parties 
refer to it . . . .”); id. at art. 38(1) (“The Court[’s] function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it . . . .”). 
 126. DETLEV F. VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 88 (4th ed. 2008); 
see also Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 31. 
 127. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (citation omitted) 
(relying on long-held customary international law). 
 128. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 31. 
 129. See supra notes 24–40 and accompanying text (common law) and notes 58–64 and 
accompanying text (civil law). 
 130. SPRANKLING ET AL., supra note 32, at 6.  For example, Vietnam allows “legitimate” 
private income and properties, but limits ownership of natural resources. Id. 
 131. ICJ Statute, supra note 122, at art. 38 (“The Court[’s] function is to decide in 
accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it . . . .”). 
 132. Id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 
(1987). 
 133. See VAGTS ET AL., supra note 126, at 62–63. 
 134. ICJ Statute, supra note 122, at art. 38(1)(b). 
 135. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (holding that customary 
international law rules prohibiting certain human rights abuses are applicable to cases 
brought under the Alien Tort Statute); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding 
that an international custom prohibiting seizure of fishing vessels in wartime was 
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contrary.136 One formulation holds that in order to constitute customary 
international law, a practice must be “general and consistent” among 
nations, and they must follow it “from a sense of legal obligation.”137
“General principles of law” are rules of decision extrapolated by 
comparing the wide variety of legal codes and judicial decisions of the 
world’s countries to find a common theme or principle.
  
138  International 
tribunals such as the ICJ use general principles of law to fill in gaps in the 
rules of decision.139  Legal scholar Ugo Mattei notes that property doctrine 
in civil law jurisdictions and common law jurisdictions seem to converge in 
ways that may provide “general principles of law” that are relevant here.140  
For example, limits on the use of land that impairs the value of neighboring 
land exist in both traditions.141  If this type of legal doctrine is widespread, 
the ICJ might recognize a “general principle” of nuisance law.142  However, 
the approach of the civil and common law traditions is somewhat different, 
since nuisance doctrine at common law is enforced by judges, while in civil 
law jurisdictions, nuisance-like uses of neighboring property are prohibited 
by “public law” regulations.143
2.  Policy Background:  What Is the Court Really Thinking About? 
 
Despite the general rule in favor of strictly literal treaty interpretation,144 
courts in common law countries likely will interpret treaty language in light 
of public policy.145  Civil law courts are less likely to consider public policy 
except in cases of nuisance-type actions.146
 
enforceable as U.S. law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987). 
  While common law courts rely 
 136. See generally Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
 137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987). 
 138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 83, at art. 53. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77–82 (4th ed. 1997). 
 139. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 66–67 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997) (holding, in the absence of relevant 
treaty language, that “it is . . . a general principle of law” that duress mitigates guilt of 
complicity in an atrocity, but that the legal systems of the world are too inconsistent with 
regard to whether duress is a complete defense in such situations to supply a definite rule). 
 140. See generally MATTEI, supra note 58, at 18–21. 
 141. See id. at 19–20. 
 142. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 62–64. 
 143. See MATTEI, supra note 58, at 20.  In the civil tradition, “public law” is distinct from 
“private law” (which includes the law of property, see supra note 120); broadly, public law 
concerns relations between citizens and the state, while private law concerns relations among 
citizens and private entities. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 108.  However, there is no 
consensus among civil law lawyers of the terms’ respective scopes or the exact boundaries 
between them. Id. 
 144. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 145. See MATTEI, supra note 58, at 198 (noting that common law courts, “in the United 
States especially” have “traditionally shown close concern for public policy”). 
 146. Id. at 37 (noting that civil “private law” courts have been “precluded from making 
decisions based on policy grounds,” leaving such concerns to “public law” courts). 
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on public policy as an interpretive rule of decision,147 civil law courts 
analogously rely on theories such as “good morals”148 and “principles of 
natural justice.”149
With respect to the applicable treaties, including the space treaties,
 
150 
there is evidence that countries have different priorities and, consequently, 
different understandings of the “intent or expectations”151 inherent in those 
treaties.152  Developed nations, for example, tend to favor an interpretation 
of the “non-appropriation clause”153 of the Outer Space Treaty that protects 
private rights to acquire and exploit outer space resources for profit.154  
Developing nations, however, prefer a strict interpretation of the clause, 
because of their concern that “the major space powers . . . would capitalize 
on their lead in space technology to exclude broad, international 
participation in the exploration and settlement of space.”155
The tension between these two policies is evident in both the vagueness 
of the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause
 
156 and the Moon 
Agreement’s failure.157  Most of the space-faring nations have refused to 
sign the Moon Agreement because of its “restrictions on ownership and the 
requirement of ‘equitable sharing.’”158
 
 147. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488 (Cal. 1990) (noting 
that the decision to accept a novel interpretation of a common law cause of action raised 
“important policy concerns” which must be “address[ed] openly”); id. at 498 (Arabian, J., 
concurring) (noting the case turned on a choice between “competing social or economic 
policies,” and suggesting that such a choice would normally be appropriate for a court to 
make (though not in that case)). 
  Not all countries fall into their 
expected camps under the model of a policy split between the developing 
world and the developed world.  For example, at the negotiation of the 
Outer Space Treaty, France’s representative was concerned that the non-
 148. GLENDON ET AL., supra note 42, at 141 (describing French and German civil code 
provisions that employ this phrase). 
 149. Id. at 144 (discussing the Austrian Civil Code of 1811).  Civil law judges employ 
such phrases as a form of “interpretation” where the codes or statutes are purportedly 
unclear, or “to modify the effect of more rigid code provisions or to set the course of a new 
development.” Id. at 139–41. 
 150. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 151. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982). 
 152. Both the Vienna Convention and the U.S. Supreme Court have held that an 
appreciation of the intent of the signatories is necessary in interpreting treaties. See supra 
notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space:  The Common Heritage of Mankind 
Principle vs. the “First in Time, First in Right” Rule of Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 
689, 693 (2004); Fountain, supra note 82, at 1762–63. 
 155. Ryan Hugh O’Donnell, Staking a Claim in the Twenty-First Century:  Real Property 
Rights on Extra-Terrestrial Bodies, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 461, 480 (2007); see also Jeremy 
L. Zell, Putting a Mine on the Moon:  Creating an International Authority to Regulate 
Mining Rights in Outer Space, 15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 489, 496 (2006). 
 156. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 41–42 (stating that the Outer Space Treaty’s 
solution to disagreement between the U.S.S.R., which “wanted to ban all private enterprise 
space activity,” and the United States, which opposed such a ban, was to “insert vague 
language that could be interpreted whichever way the reader wanted”). 
 157. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 158. Fountain, supra note 82, at 1764. 
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appropriation clause would leave room for private appropriation of outer 
space territory,159 and France later signed the more clearly anti-private-
property Moon Agreement, though it has not ratified it.160
D.  The “Common Heritage of Mankind” and Two Analogous Treaties 
 
One difficulty in interpreting the space treaties’ effect on private property 
rights is deciding whether the contentious “common heritage of mankind” 
doctrine applies.161  The most frequently recognized elements of the 
common heritage principle are non-appropriation; shared international 
management; sharing of benefits derived from resource exploitation; 
peaceful use; and preservation.162  Although the Moon Agreement—which 
explicitly applies that doctrine to the moon—is a failed treaty,163 one school 
of thought holds that the common heritage of mankind doctrine originates 
in the “province of all mankind” language164 applied to the moon in the 
Outer Space Treaty.165  If this view is correct, the doctrine may 
significantly limit lunar private property rights.166
Since some treaties have applied the common heritage of mankind 
doctrine to internationally managed resources, at least one commentator has 
found those treaties relevant in the context of lunar property rights.
 
167  
Relevant treaties include those governing Antarctica168 and deep-sea 
mining.169
 
 159. U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Summary of 
the Record of the Seventeenth Meeting, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.70 (Oct. 21, 
1966). 
 
 160. For a discussion of the difference between “signing” and “ratifying” a treaty, see 
supra note 83. 
 161. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Comment, Moving the Heavens:  Lunar Mining and the 
“Common Heritage of Mankind” in the Moon Treaty, 42 UCLA L. REV. 575, 580–81 (1994) 
(noting that the Moon Agreement “declares the mineral resources of the moon the ‘common 
heritage of mankind,’” a phrase whose “ambiguity and ramifications . . . have left space law 
one of the most unstable areas of international law”). 
 162. Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources:  A 
Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 
23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 819, 827 (1990); see also Zell, supra note 155, at 497–98. 
 163. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 164. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I, ¶ 1. 
 165. Hoffstadt, supra note 161, at 587. 
 166. See, e.g., Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96 (noting that the common 
heritage of mankind doctrine would force “commercial interests in the wealthier nations” to 
share profits from outer space resources with poorer nations). 
 167. See, e.g., Heim, supra note 162, at 845. 
 168. See Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96–97; Cody Tucker, Lunar Rights:  
How Current International Law Addresses Rights to Use and Exploit Lunar Resources, the 
Practical Difficulties Attached, and Solutions for the Future, 34 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 
591, 612 (2009); Apking, supra note 109, at 452–53. 
 169. See Hoffstadt, supra note 161, at 592–95; Zell, supra note 155, at 500–01. 
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1.  Antarctic Law 
Like the moon, Antarctica is a “vast expanse of land that is undeveloped 
and contains mineral deposits.”170  Also like the moon, the exploration and 
use of Antarctic resources requires large investments of capital and 
technology.171  Following the early-nineteenth-century discovery that 
Antarctica was a continent rather than a patchwork of ice islands, seven 
countries successively claimed sovereignty in Antarctic territory over the 
ensuing century.172  The first attempt173 by the international community to 
regulate the use of Antarctica, the Antarctic Treaty,174 came into force in 
the early 1960s.175  The Antarctic Treaty’s stated purpose—to “ease the 
tension surrounding [the] various sovereignty claims”176—resembles the 
Outer Space Treaty’s purpose of avoiding a race to claim sovereignty in 
space as the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union 
heated up.177  While the space treaty regime appears to leave the right to 
exploit mineral resources intact,178 mining in Antarctica is explicitly 
prohibited by the Madrid Protocol.179  Although the Antarctic Treaty does 
not invoke the common heritage of mankind doctrine, at least one 
commentator claims that the principle is widely understood to be applicable 
to Antarctica.180
2.  Law Governing Deep-Sea Mining 
 
Like Antarctica, the deep seabed resembles the moon in that travelling 
there and extracting resources is expensive and requires sophisticated 
technology.181  Mining of the deep seabed began in the late 1960s, when 
the technology for extracting minerals from the ocean floor became 
available.182
 
 170. Sattler, supra note 
  Responding to the resulting opportunity and possible threat of 
conflict, the international community constructed a legal regime to regulate 
82, at 32 (suggesting that the Antarctic regulatory regime is a 
good model for regulating outer space exploration because of the similarities of extreme 
environments and costs of exploration). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Buxton, supra note 154, at 696. 
 173. Heim, supra note 167, at 839. 
 174. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794. 
 175. Buxton, supra note 154, at 696. 
 176. Heim, supra note 167, at 839. 
 177. Buxton, supra note 154, at 696–97; see also supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.  
The Antarctic Treaty shows a concern similar to the Outer Space Treaty’s concern for 
preventing the militarization of the new territory. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 174, pmbl. 
(“[I]t is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes . . . .”). 
 178. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I, ¶ 2 (“Outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States . . . .”). 
 179. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty art. 7, Oct. 4, 1991, 30 
I.L.M. 1455, 1464 [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, 
at 97. 
 180. See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 154, at 696. 
 181. See Sattler, supra note 82, at 34. 
 182. Lea Brilmayer & Natalie Klein, Land and Sea:  Two Sovereignty Regimes in Search 
of a Common Denominator, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 703, 726 (2001). 
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undersea resource exploitation.183  After a series of incremental agreements, 
which did not lay down rules for deep-sea mining,184 these efforts 
culminated in the 1982 United Nations’ Third Law of the Sea 
Convention185 (UNCLOS).  The United Nations General Assembly later 
adopted a revised version of UNCLOS, the Implementation Agreement of 
1994.186
UNCLOS was the first treaty to use the “common heritage of mankind” 
language.
   
187  The common heritage language in UNCLOS, later repeated in 
the Implementation Agreement, prohibited territorial appropriation of the 
seabed by national governments.188  The 1982 UNCLOS also created an 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), which licenses and regulates deep-
sea mining.189  Before the 1994 revisions, the ISA “preempted free-market 
enterprise” by giving all nations an equal vote in permitting access to the 
seabed, regardless of “technological capabilities or contributions to 
undersea exploration.”190  As a result, most rich countries, including the 
United States, refused to join UNCLOS in 1982.191  However, the 
Implementation Agreement substantially changed the “elaboration and 
implementation” of the common heritage doctrine.192  The changes 
weakened the common heritage doctrine’s original intent to redistribute 
resources from countries with the wealth and technology to exploit 
undersea resources to the poorer nations that lack those capacities.193
 
 183. See id. (suggesting that there was a motive to help poor countries gain a fair share of 
the world’s natural wealth); Heim, supra note 
  Rich 
countries’ reluctance to join UNCLOS until after the common heritage of 
167, at 824 (alluding to the possibility of 
conflict and environmental problems due to undersea mining). 
 184. See Heim, supra note 167, at 824–25. 
 185. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 186. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/48/263 (July 28, 1994) [hereinafter Implementation Agreement]; Hoffstadt, supra 
note 161, at 593 (indicating that the Implementation Agreement was a revision of 
UNCLOS). 
 187. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 182, at 726 (describing former Maltese U.N. 
ambassador Arvid Pardo’s proposal to include the “common heritage” language); Buxton, 
supra note 154, at 694 (referring to Pardo as the “forefather of the common heritage of 
mankind principle in the law of the sea”). 
 188. Brilmayer & Klein, supra note 182, at 726; see also Implementation Agreement, 
supra note 186, pmbl. 
 189. Implementation Agreement, supra note 186; see also Sattler, supra note 82, at 34. 
 190. Sattler, supra note 82, at 34–35.  One effect of this veto power would be to allow 
developing nations a share of resource exploitation without sharing in the cost of investment. 
 191. Id. at 35; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96. 
 192. Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 96. 
 193. Id.; see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:  Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Environment & Public Works, 108th Cong. 68 (2004) (statement of John F. 
Turner, Asst. Sec’y, Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Envtl. and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of 
State) (explaining that the 1994 amendments to UNCLOS in the Implementation Agreement 
give the United States veto power over any attempt to force sharing of profits derived by 
U.S. companies from undersea mining, thereby removing “flaws” which had kept the U.S. 
from signing the original UNCLOS in 1982). 
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mankind doctrine had been limited mirrors their rejection of the Moon 
Agreement for endorsing the doctrine.194
Whether the common heritage of mankind doctrine applies to lunar 
property claims will be a key argument of any litigation.
 
195  The lunar 
property litigator should be familiar with each side of the argument.196
II.  THE COMMENTATORS’ AND THEORISTS’ DISPUTE 
 
The Outer Space Treaty prohibits “national appropriation [of the moon] 
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means.”197  This provision is generally understood to prohibit a nation from 
claiming a part of the moon as territory under its jurisdiction.198  However, 
there is a dispute over whether the provision prohibits “appropriation” by 
private, non-governmental parties.199
A.  The Plain Language Dispute 
  Part II of this Note examines 
different aspects of the conflict over the status of private property claims in 
outer space.  Part II.A examines different interpretations of the plain 
language of the space treaty regime, focusing on the Outer Space Treaty’s 
non-appropriation clause.  Part II.B presents the conflicting opinions over 
whether national registries of private claims are legal.  Part II.B also 
discusses conflicting interpretations of the only U.S. court decision to 
address property rights in celestial bodies.  Part II.C explores different 
opinions on the applicability of the common heritage of mankind principle 
to outer space resources. 
Those who claim that the current treaty regime prohibits private property 
on the moon argue that private claims would be “appropriation by other 
means” within the meaning of the Outer Space Treaty.200  Some opponents 
claim that the Outer Space Treaty’s non-appropriation clause extends to 
private parties through their citizenship in a member state.201
 
 194. See supra notes 
  Those who 
argue that private property rights can and do exist on the moon respond that 
since the non-appropriation clause does not explicitly mention private 
82–84, 87, 158 and accompanying text. 
 195. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 196. See infra Part II.C. 
 197. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II. 
 198. See, e.g., CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 
47–48 (1982). 
 199. See John Adolph, Comment, The Recent Boom in Private Space Development and 
the Necessity of an International Framework Embracing Private Property Rights to 
Encourage Investment, 40 INT’L LAW. 961, 964 (2006). Compare CHRISTOL, supra note 198, 
at 47–48, with GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 46 (Boris 
Belitzky trans., 1984). 
 200. See, e.g., Tennen, supra note 89, at 805–06; see also Zell, supra note 155, at 499 
(“Article II . . . stands for a prohibition of laying claim to private property in space.”). 
 201. See Sattler, supra note 82, at 28; Adolph, supra note 199, at 964 (arguing that 
appropriation of lunar land by a private party would constitute appropriation “by . . . other 
means” by the party’s country). 
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individuals and companies, the treaty permits appropriation by them.202  
Opponents rebut this argument, calling it an excessively literal reading of 
the non-appropriation clause.203
 One argument that opponents rely on looks to the legislative history of 
the Outer Space Treaty in interpreting its plain language.
 
204  The argument 
maintains that a statement of the United States representative to the United 
Nations General Assembly during the negotiations of the Outer Space 
Treaty supports this view.205  Representative Arthur J. Goldberg said to the 
Assembly that “as we stand on the threshold of the space age, our first 
responsibility as governments is clear:  we must make sure that man’s 
earthly conflicts will not be carried into outer space.”206  Other 
commentators do not go as far, but maintain that the quote shows that the 
Outer Space Treaty was conceived by all parties as discouraging private 
property claims.207
Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes counter that Article II’s non-
appropriation language is a “substantially meaningless face-saving 
formulation,” designed to resolve the impasse during treaty negotiations 
between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, who “adamantly 
opposed . . . the Communist proposal to ban all private enterprise space 
activity.”
 
208  They maintain that the legislative history shows that the treaty 
language was meant to preserve the possibility of private property in 
space.209
Those asserting the existence of private lunar property rights also argue 
that the Outer Space Treaty’s restriction on “national appropriation by claim 
 
 
 202. Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 349, 351 (1969); Wayne N. White, Jr., Presentation at the 40th Colloquium on the Law 
of Space of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics:  Real Property in Outer 
Space 1 (Oct. 6–10, 1997), available at http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/real_
property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml; see also Coffey, supra note 82, at 125–26; Wasser & 
Jobes, supra note 8, at 44–46; Fountain, supra note 82, at 1762–63. 
 203. See, e.g., O’Donnell, supra note 155, at 481 (arguing that the non-appropriation 
clause prohibits appropriation by private parties although the clause does not specifically 
mention them). 
 204. Buxton, supra note 154, at 700 (interpreting Representative Arthur J. Goldberg’s 
statement to express opposition to “first in time, first in right” private property claims); see 
also G. Harry Stine, Patricia M. Sterns, & Leslie I. Tennen, Preliminary Jurisprudential 
Observations Concerning Property Rights on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies in the 
Commercial Space Age, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF 
OUTER SPACE 50, 54 (1996) (arguing that if the Outer Space Treaty allowed private parties to 
appropriate outer space territory, “[w]ars of conquest . . . could result” just as if nations 
themselves had done the appropriating). 
 205. See Buxton, supra note 154, at 700; Stine et al., supra note 204, at 54. 
 206. Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Rep. to the U.N. Gen. Assemb., Address Before the U.N. 
Gen. Assemb. (Dec. 17, 1966), in 56 DEP’T ST. BULL. 78, 81 (1967). 
 207. See, e.g., Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 63 
(1999) (arguing that Goldberg’s statement shows that “[c]reating a space property 
law . . . was not a priority,” resulting in an Outer Space Treaty that is “at worst[] hostile to 
the privatization and commercialization of space resources”). 
 208. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 57. 
 209. Id. (arguing that the vague language was a way for the U.S. to preserve for future 
negotiation the possibility of private property in space in the face of Soviet opposition); see 
also Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 41 n.15. 
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of sovereignty”210 cannot be understood as restricting private individuals’ 
claims, since governments are frequently subject to restrictions that do not 
apply to their citizens.211  Opponents of this view argue, however, that 
treating private property claims in space as separate from claims of 
sovereignty by governments is a false distinction.212  They contend that 
private ownership of parts of celestial bodies is forbidden because such 
ownership would presuppose a territorial sovereign competent to confer 
title, the very sovereignty prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.213  
Proponents respond that private entities that seek to exploit outer space 
resources would not necessarily be composed of citizens of one country.214  
Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention speak in terms 
of “launching states,” rather than “citizens” of a particular country.215  As a 
result, the argument concludes, recognition of private land claims by a 
government would not be tantamount to claiming sovereignty over outer 
space territory by that government.216
B.  The Problem of Registering and Recognizing Claims 
 
Those espousing the possibility of lunar private property suggest that 
establishing a registry to keep track of such land claims would not be 
appropriation under the Outer Space Treaty.217  They also argue that a 
registry operated by a signatory nation to the Outer Space Treaty would not 
violate the Treaty’s prohibition of “appropriation by other means” because 
the language of the Treaty does not explicitly prohibit such registries.218
 
 210. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 
 
5, at art. II. 
 211. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 56 (observing that, for example, a U.S. citizen may 
adopt a particular religion, get married, or engage in “numerous trade and commercial 
activities,” while such activities are prohibited to the government); see also id. at 56–57 
(stating that “[p]rivate citizens do not suddenly become mere legal parts . . . of the State 
because the State authorizes and supervises their space activities” and concluding that the 
framers of the Outer Space Treaty must not have intended to prevent such private ownership 
in space). 
 212. See, e.g., Tennen, supra note 89, at 805 (arguing that such claims present a “classic 
distinction without a difference”). 
 213. Press Release, Statement of the Board of Directors of the International Institute of 
Space Law (IISL), INT’L INST. OF SPACE L. (Mar. 22, 2009), http://www.iislweb.org/docs/
Statement%20BoD.pdf. 
 214. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 53–54; cf. Fountain, supra note 82, at 1778 & 
n.161 (describing the likely multi-national makeup of future companies investing in outer 
space resource exploitation). 
 215. The “launching state” is the country from which persons or equipment were 
launched. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text; see also Wasser & Jobes, supra 
note 8, at 54 & n.71 (discussing the orientation of the space treaty regime around “launching 
states”); cf. Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 84–85 & n.11 (noting that 
governments “may also be held absolutely liable for the actions of their citizens in space,” 
but citing to the Liability Convention in the footnote, which elaborates the “launching state” 
theory of liability). 
 216. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 53–54. 
 217. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II; Pat Dasch et al., Conference on Space 
Property Rights:  Next Steps, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE 
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 174, 178 (2000). 
 218. See Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 46. 
2011] A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE LUNAR LITIGATOR 1391 
Opponents respond that a nation that kept such a registry would be in 
violation of the treaty.219  The only value of such a registry would be to 
provide a legal basis for claimants to exclude others from the land at 
issue.220  Providing such a legal basis, the opponents argue, is tantamount 
to exerting sovereignty over that land.221  Opponents also argue that the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada’s holding in Nemitz v. United 
States222 creates precedent that private ownership of celestial bodies is 
prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty.223  The plaintiff, Gregory Nemitz, 
claimed property in an asteroid through registration with the Archimedes 
Institute.224  The court held that neither Nemitz’s website registration of his 
claim, nor the United States’ refusal to join the Moon Agreement,225 nor the 
language of the Outer Space Treaty “created any rights in Nemitz to 
appropriate private property rights on asteroids.”226
Proponents argue that such reasoning confuses invalid attempts to claim 
lunar land from Earth with legitimate claims based on actual presence on 
the surface of the moon.
 
227  Professors Wasser and Jobes suggest that 
“actual occupation and use” of the claimed land would materially change 
the situation, and consequently the outcome, in Nemitz.228  A related view 
holds that claiming outer space property simply through registration on a 
website is “downright silly,”229 but that regardless of these flawed claims, 
international custom has produced a set of property rights sufficient for 
private exploitation.230
 
 219. Tennen, supra note 
 
89, at 805 (“The mere recognition of claims by a state [by 
keeping a registry] would constitute a de facto exclusion of other states and their nationals, 
and thereby constitute a form of national appropriation.”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. See Virgiliu Pop, Appropriation in Outer Space:  The Relationship Between Land 
Ownership and Sovereignty on the Celestial Bodies, 16 SPACE POL’Y 275, 278 (2000). 
 222. No. CV-N030599, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 26, 2004). 
 223. Coffey, supra note 82, at 140 (claiming that the Nemitz decision supports a view of 
“the current legal framework [as] barring real property rights in space”).  As the text, infra, 
accompanying notes 302–08 suggests, the legal effect of Nemitz in future lunar property 
disputes appears limited.  Nevertheless, as the only example of an actual United States court 
examining an outer space property claim, potential litigants and contract drafters in this area 
may utilize its reasoning in pursuing lunar property claims. 
 224. Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1; see ARCHIMEDES INST., 
http://www.permanent.com/ep-archi.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 225. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 226. Nemitz, 2004 WL 3167042, at *2. 
 227. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 50–52 (arguing that such claims would be 
legitimate because there exists a universal rule that first possession gives rise to ownership). 
 228. Id. (arguing that actual possession of lunar land would give ownership a firmer basis 
than claims made merely from Earth). 
 229. James E. Dunstan, Toward a Unified Theory of Space Property Rights:  Sometimes 
the Best Way to Predict the Weather Is to Look Outside, in SPACE:  THE FREE-MARKET 
FRONTIER, supra note 59, at 223, 228. 
 230. Id. at 225–26 (“[C]ustomary international law, consistent with the Outer Space 
Treaty, has come to develop a regime for property use that is compatible with private 
investment, even if it does not directly mirror Western concepts of real property 
ownership.”). 
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  Although claims of ownership resulting from the purchase of a 
certificate and registration on a website are invalid,231 such specious claims 
do not invalidate a registry of claims made by persons in actual possession 
of lunar land.232
C.  The Common Heritage of Mankind Doctrine’s Application to Private 
Property Claims in Space 
 
The meaning of the common heritage of mankind doctrine233 and 
whether it applies to the moon is another point of contention.  Opponents of 
lunar property rights point to Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, which 
provides that “[t]he exploration and use of . . . the moon . . . shall be carried 
out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their 
degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of 
all mankind.”234  They claim that “any resource or benefit derived from 
[lunar] resources . . . should serve all mankind.”235  When Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty is read together with Article II, opponents argue, the 
treaty seems to prohibit private exclusive possession of lunar property.236  
These observers point out, moreover, that at the time the Outer Space 
Treaty was passed, all of the ratifying countries had reason to support the 
common heritage doctrine.237  Although the Outer Space Treaty lacks the 
actual words “common heritage of mankind,” some commentators hold that 
Articles I and II imply an equivalent restriction on exclusive use,238 or 
implicitly contain the common heritage doctrine.239
 
 231. See, for example, Gregory Nemitz’s attempt to claim property in an asteroid through 
a website’s registry. See supra notes 
  Furthermore, 
opponents contend that the “non-appropriation” language in Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty was motivated by developing nations’ fears of being 
left behind in the exploitation of outer space resources by more 
222–26 and accompanying text; see also LUNAR 
EMBASSY, http://www.lunarembassy.com (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (a website purporting 
to offer lunar land for sale). 
 232. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 50–51 (arguing that registration of claims “based 
on true occupation and use of the land” would not constitute appropriation by the launching 
state). 
 233. See supra notes 163–67, 188–89 and accompanying text. 
 234. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I. 
 235. See Mary E. Schwind, Open Stars:  An Examination of the United States Push to 
Privatize International Telecommunications Satellites, 10 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 87, 
93 (1986). 
 236. Eric Husby, Comment, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT’L L. 
& PRAC. 359, 364 (1994); see also CHRISTOL, supra note 198, at 47–48 (noting that the Outer 
Space Treaty’s purpose—to ensure “opportunity to use is open to all”—casts doubt on the 
possibility of rights to exclude). 
 237. Adolph, supra note 199, at 964 (arguing that the intent of the Outer Space Treaty at 
the time it was signed is in harmony with the common heritage doctrine). 
 238. Id.; see also Hoffstadt, supra note 161, at 587–88 (suggesting that the Moon 
Agreement’s “common heritage” language originated in the Outer Space Treaty’s Article I 
“province of all mankind” language). 
 239. Fountain, supra note 82, at 1762 (“The concepts expressed in the Preamble, and 
Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty . . . form the basis of the Common Heritage 
doctrine as applied to outer space.”). 
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technologically advanced nations,240 the same motivation that brought the 
common heritage language into the Moon Agreement.241  Consequently, 
opponents argue, the meaning of Article II must be understood as a version 
of the common heritage doctrine.242  This means that Article II must 
prohibit lunar private property.243
Proponents of lunar property rights argue that opponents exaggerate the 
importance of the “province of all mankind” language of the Outer Space 
Treaty.
 
244  The proponents point out that the Moon Agreement245 was 
rejected by almost all the space-faring nations precisely because it made 
explicit an anti-property principle that is arguably only implicit in the Outer 
Space Treaty.246  The Moon Agreement explicitly includes common 
heritage language,247 restricts private ownership,248 and provides for 
“equitable sharing” of the benefits of any exploitation.249  For some, the 
widespread rejection of the Moon Agreement is proof that the existing 
treaty regime excludes the common heritage doctrine,250 thus allowing 
private ownership of lunar land and resources.251
Even if the common heritage doctrine is an implicit principle of the Outer 
Space Treaty, proponents argue, that doctrine should be understood by its 
definition in UNCLOS.
 
252  Proponents of lunar property rights argue that 
UNCLOS’s definition of common heritage of mankind allows for “free 
use,” with the result that, while outer space itself may not be appropriated, 
its resources may.253
Opponents contend, however, that the common heritage doctrine 
prohibits any claims to private property in space, whether one relies on 
UNCLOS or the Moon Agreement for a definition.
 
254
 
 240. See, e.g., Carl Q. Christol, Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty Revisited, 9 
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 217 (1984); see supra notes 
  The application of 
the common heritage doctrine in outer space would mean that the benefits 
156–58 and accompanying text. 
 241. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, International Space Law:  Into the Twenty-First Century, 
25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 225, 230–31 (1992). 
 242. O’Donnell, supra note 155, at 477, 480–81. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 5, at art. I, ¶ 1; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 43. 
 245. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 246. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 42–43; Fountain, supra note 82, at 1763–64. 
 247. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 11(1) (“The moon and its resources are the 
common heritage of mankind . . . .”). 
 248. Id. at art. 11(3) (“Neither . . . the moon, nor any part thereof . . . shall become 
property of any . . . non-governmental entity or of any natural person.”). 
 249. Id. at art. 11(7)(d) (stating that members are committed to “[a]n equitable sharing by 
all States [sic] Parties in the benefits derived from . . . [lunar] resources, whereby the 
interests and needs of the developing countries, as well as the efforts of those countries 
which have contributed . . . to the exploration . . . shall be given special consideration.”). 
 250. Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 42–43 (noting that the Moon Agreement “would 
have banned all private property in space,” causing the United States, among others, to reject 
it, with the result that the Agreement is “not a part of international law”). 
 251. Coffey, supra note 82, at 127–28; Wasser & Jobes, supra note 8, at 42 n.19. 
 252. See, e.g., Husby, supra note 236, at 369–70; see also supra Part I.D.2. 
 253. See, e.g., Husby, supra note 236, at 370. 
 254. See, e.g., Zell, supra note 155, at 499. 
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of any resources extracted from the moon would be distributed equally to 
all nations, precluding ownership by any traditional definition.255
III.  THE AMBIGUITY OF LUNAR PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND A SUGGESTION FOR RESOLVING IT 
 
This part gives an answer to whether property rights exist on the moon, 
concluding that they probably do not.  Part III.A argues that the theoretical 
question, “Do lunar property rights exist?” is in fact the same as the 
practical question, “Can a plaintiff win a suit to protect his lunar property?”  
Part III.A therefore answers both questions by presenting a hypothetical 
lunar property litigation.  Part III.A suggests which arguments from Part II 
will be considered by the relevant court, and how the court will decide 
between the opposing arguments. 
Part III.B offers a solution to the ambiguity in the law.  Part III.B argues 
that the Moon Agreement should be rehabilitated and implemented with an 
international regulating body, thus making practicable commercial 
exploitation while unquestionably ruling out private claims to property. 
A.  What If Lunar Property Litigation Happened Tomorrow?  
The Law as It Stands Today 
If litigation over lunar property commenced tomorrow, a purported 
owner would likely claim an injury arising out of a trespass,256 an unlawful 
ouster,257 or a nuisance in the vicinity that prevented him from extracting 
value from the land.258  These injuries, had they occurred on Earth, would 
be subject to remedy.  A plaintiff would have possessory actions or 
proprietary actions in civil law countries,259 and the law of trespass, 
ejectment, and nuisance in common law countries.260
Part III.A looks at each stage of a hypothetical litigation and the best 
arguments for each side, given the current state of lunar property law.  Part 
III.A.1 focuses on a court’s likely reasoning with respect to whether it has 
jurisdiction, concluding that a U.S. court probably will find jurisdiction 
because of the traditional focus on jurisdiction, combined with the 
preference for reading treaties literally and the Outer Space Treaty’s explicit 
jurisdictional grant.  Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3 then address a court’s ability 
to enforce the plaintiff’s claimed rights.  Part III.A.3 concludes that a court 
 
 
 255. If the profits of outer space resources have to be “equitably distributed,” then the 
party who invested in extracting them does not really own them. See Buxton, supra note 154, 
at 692 (explaining the view of “less-developed nations” of the common heritage doctrine); 
see also Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 82, at 92 (recounting that “a few United 
States companies,” considering an unmanned mining expedition to the moon which was to 
land in Australia, abandoned their plans because, as a party to the Moon Agreement with its 
common heritage language, Australia might confiscate any minerals returned from outer 
space). 
 256. See supra notes 20, 66, 69 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra notes 21, 65 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text. 
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probably will not be able to enforce a judgment because the Outer Space 
Treaty may prohibit private lunar property, and given ambiguous treaty 
language, U.S. courts will rely on legislative history to find the 
interpretation prohibiting lunar private property the most reasonable one.  
Part III.A.3 suggests the policy arguments likely to be considered by the 
court.  Finally, Part III.A.4 describes how a lunar property claim might be 
argued in the ICJ, concluding that, although the ICJ would hear the dispute, 
it would be unlikely to rule in favor of the plaintiff because of the dominant 
developing-country view against recognizing private lunar property. 
1.  The First Hurdle:  Jurisdiction 
The lunar litigator’s first job will be convincing the court that it has 
jurisdiction over a matter.  This subsection suggests the best arguments and 
counterarguments for a court taking jurisdiction in a lunar property case, 
and concludes that U.S. courts probably will find that they have 
jurisdiction, but that courts in other countries will not. 
Any country from which equipment or people are launched into space 
retains “jurisdiction and control” over them, according to the Outer Space 
Treaty.261  Furthermore, countries are required to register any such 
launches, and all have licensing systems in place.262  If damage is caused by 
an actor in space, the Liability Convention allows the injured party to make 
a claim against the country from which the actor launched (Launching 
State).263  The Liability Convention, article XI(2), states that “natural or 
juridical persons” are allowed to sue on liability “in the courts or 
administrative tribunals . . . of a launching state.”264
The plaintiff should bring suit in the courts of general jurisdiction of the 
defendant’s Launching State.
 
265  The Registry Convention assures that 
there would be a record of the Launching State of any defendant on file 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.266
A United States court likely will find that it has jurisdiction based on the 
following reasoning.  The defendant is liable for damage to the plaintiff’s 
property on the moon.  The court will note that, since the Outer Space 
Treaty’s Article VIII states that the Launching State retains “jurisdiction 
and control over” persons and objects launched from its territory, the court 
has jurisdiction over the defendant under the treaty.
  The defendant should 
first try to convince the court that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim. 
267
 
 261. See supra note 
  If the defendant 
launched from the United States, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over his 
person and his equipment, even while they are on the moon. 
97 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 108–09 and 
accompanying text. 
 263. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra note 91. 
 266. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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U.S. courts have historically focused on jurisdiction over the person of 
the defendant more than territorial jurisdiction.268  This means the court 
likely will accept jurisdiction, since it is premised on the treaty’s apparent 
grant of jurisdiction specifically over the person of the defendant.269  The 
strongest counter-argument that the court will consider is that it should 
refuse to assert jurisdiction over the property because it is outside the 
territory of the United States.270  The property must be outside the territory 
of the United States pursuant to the non-appropriation clause of the Outer 
Space Treaty.271
Moreover, the overall language of the Liability Convention suggests that 
the treaty’s purpose is to address liability for accidental damage to 
equipment, not damage to property interests, though such damage may 
technically be tortious.  Then again, the treaties are meant to be read as 
strictly as possible; courts are traditionally more careful, with treaties as 
opposed to statutes, about finding legislative intent that is not explicit in the 
language.
 
272  Courts will only look to the legislative intent of a treaty when 
a literal interpretation would clearly frustrate the purposes of the drafters.273
In other countries, the plaintiff’s chances are weaker.  Civil law countries 
have a natural rights theory of property,
  
Here, the ambiguity in the space treaties with respect to private property 
helps the plaintiff.  If there is any doubt about what the intent of the drafters 
was, then it is more difficult to argue that the intent is being frustrated.  
Consequently the court will limit itself to the language of the treaties, which 
grants jurisdiction. 
274 which helps the plaintiff.  The 
plaintiff will have established possession, and thereby natural rights, over 
the lunar property.275  However, civil law countries also have a stronger 
tradition of territorial jurisdiction than the United States.276  A civil law 
tribunal would be unlikely to recognize jurisdiction over purported property 
located outside the tribunal’s country.277
 
 268. See supra notes 
  The fact that the Liability 
Convention only applies to torts against equipment and persons therefore 
would be more persuasive in civil law countries.  The “jurisdiction and 
control” referred to in the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention 
is unlikely to convince civil law countries’ courts to assert jurisdiction 
extraterritorially, in the face of long-standing tradition.  Civil law countries’ 
courts are more likely to see the treaties’ jurisdictional language as 
analogous to the internationally recognized understanding of “nationality” 
jurisdiction whereby a court retains jurisdiction over its country’s nationals, 
114–18 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 118. 
 271. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra note 120. 
 277. See supra note 120. 
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wherever they are.278  However, “nationality” jurisdiction has never led to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over property.279  The only countervailing 
argument for a civil law court is that extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
property has not been recognized only because, in practice, real property is 
always located in some country’s territory.  A civil law tribunal may also 
consider the practical aspects of the situation.  Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty rules out lunar property located in any nation’s territory280 and 
therefore, if the tribunal fails to exert jurisdiction, it would leave 
unremedied an injury by an individual over whom the space treaties give it 
“jurisdiction and control.”  Ultimately, however, the weight of tradition is 
against this line of reasoning in civil law countries.  Civil law countries lack 
a tradition of precedent, whereby tribunals are free to craft the law to adjust 
to changing circumstances.281
In countries that have adopted the Moon Agreement, with its restrictive 
view of private property, a court is even less likely to assert jurisdiction 
over a lunar property claim.
  Consequently, a civil law tribunal would 
likely refuse jurisdiction. 
282  The treaty specifically rules out private 
property on the moon.283
2.  The Complaint 
  Consequently, courts whose countries’ are party 
to the Moon Agreement would likely conclude that the space treaties 
collectively must be interpreted to exclude jurisdiction over torts against 
purported space property. 
If the court accepts jurisdiction, the plaintiff will have to draft additional 
elements of a complaint that alleges the elements of some tort against the 
purported property.  Since the United States is a common law country,284 an 
aggrieved purported owner of lunar property could bring an action in 
ejectment if the defendant is occupying the property.  Of the three examples 
at the beginning of this Note, this would be the one between Companies D 
and E.285  In that example, after the plaintiff identifies resources and signals 
his possession by, for example, leaving equipment at the site for future 
extraction, the defendant forcibly removes the equipment and commences 
extraction while excluding the purported owner.  The hypothetical with 
Companies A and B exemplifies a trespass.286
 
 278. See supra note 
  If the defendant occupied 
the plaintiff’s purported property in a way that did not prevent the plaintiff 
from using it, the action would be trespass.  Finally, if the defendant were 
using the neighboring land in a way that prevented the plaintiff from 
119. 
 279. See supra note 119 and accompanying text; cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 
692, 761–62 (2004) (observing that extraterritorial nationality jurisdiction arose in order to 
deal with crimes such as piracy, not torts against property). 
 280. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra notes 1–4, 20 and accompanying text. 
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removing the resources he claimed, he would bring an action in nuisance.  
This type of situation includes the hypothetical involving companies X 
and Y.287
The line of reasoning that a court will consider on the side against finding 
any remediable tort will likely be as follows.  Even though the space 
treaties give the court jurisdiction over the defendant and his equipment, 
there is no wrong to be remedied since the plaintiff has no right in the 
land.
  Both nuisance and trespass claims could be brought together in 
cases where objects intrude onto the plaintiff’s land as a byproduct of the 
defendant’s activities on neighboring land.  For example, dust removed 
from the defendant’s land might fall on top of ice on the plaintiff’s land, 
thus making water extraction more difficult or costly. 
288  Even if the space treaties are meant to address intentional torts 
involving property, such liability can only apply to torts with respect to 
equipment or resources once in the possession of a plaintiff post-extraction.  
To allow a plaintiff to claim a property interest in resources in place or the 
land that contains them would violate the non-appropriation clause of the 
Outer Space Treaty.289  Several interpretations290 of the Outer Space Treaty 
suggest that it prohibits private property claims on the moon by its plain 
language291 or by implication, since recognition292
A court will weigh against these arguments by relying on the 
commentary on the other side of the non-appropriation issue.
 of such claims by the 
courts of any member state would violate the treaty. 
293  That is, if 
the Outer Space Treaty intended to prohibit private property claims on the 
moon, it would have said so explicitly, as in Article IX of the Moon 
Agreement.294  The fact that the Moon Agreement was widely rejected 
shows that the United States and the other parties to the Outer Space Treaty 
(most of whom rejected the Moon Agreement) were not agreeing to rule out 
private property claims.295
However, even if the court accepts the latter arguments over the former, 
it would only lead the court to conclude that the possibility of lunar 
property cannot be ruled out.  In order to award a judgment to the plaintiff, 
the court would still need to be convinced that it should positively 
recognize and defend such property.  The court would need to craft a new 
rule that extends common law property rights to a place without a 
government or a society.  A court would not adopt this approach without 
very strong policy arguments for why it should do so.
 
296
 
 287. See supra note 
  The next section 
of this Note considers the policy arguments for and against such an 
approach. 
22 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra Part I.A.1; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 212–13, 205–08 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra Part II.A. 
 292. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 202, 208–11 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 82, 245–51 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 147. 
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3.  Property in Outer Space:  The Policy Arguments 
The policy arguments a court will consider in favor of defending lunar 
property rights are as follows.  UNCLOS’s rejection by the United 
States,297 subsequent revisions making private exploitation and ownership 
of the seabed easier, and subsequent eventual acceptance by the United 
States, all suggest that the United States has a clear policy of recognizing 
property in internationally managed areas that lack sovereignty.298
On the other hand, the court will be faced with the competing argument 
that the policy behind the space treaties was to prevent the militarization of 
space, not to preserve private property rights.  The history of the Outer 
Space Treaty negotiations demonstrates that property rights were barely 
considered.
  The 
moon is sufficiently analogous to the deep seabed that the United States’ 
policy interests may be the same for each.  Just as the United States insisted 
on the right to exploit undersea resources, it similarly may have intended to 
retain that right on the moon. 
299  In the absence of a clear expression of United States policy, 
the court might do best to avoid creating law in a literal and figurative 
vacuum.  It is true that, though not a focus, property rights were mentioned 
on a few occasions during the Outer Space Treaty negotiations.300  
However, the court likely will decide that those few occasions are not 
sufficient to decide the issue in favor of defending lunar property rights.  
United States policy toward the seabed as illustrated by the story of 
UNCLOS is less ambiguous than U.S. policy toward the moon as illustrated 
by the story of the space treaties.301
The U.S. policy toward the commercialization of space will weigh in 
favor of defending lunar property rights.
 
302  Since the 1984 Commercial 
Space Launch Act,303 the United States has consistently encouraged the 
commercial exploitation of space.304  The court will have to note that 
Nemitz v. United States305 rejected the argument that the United States’ 
policy of supporting the commercialization of space conferred any property 
right on Nemitz.306  However, Nemitz does not convincingly decide the 
issue here, since Nemitz did nothing to establish his purported property 
claim except for registering the claim on a website.307  Alan Wasser and 
Douglas Jobes were correct in their assessment that actual presence and 
possession of the land should make a difference in the enforceability of a 
claim of ownership.308
 
 297. See supra notes 
  Courts should not enforce property claims made 
190–91 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 303. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 305. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text. 
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merely by registering the claim from a distance because such a claim does 
not provide a clear signal to people who are on-site and might lay claim to 
the land.  Claims through registration only would create an opportunity for 
conflict because no claimant would reasonably know of other claimants.  
However, if the claim is made on-site, the situation is different:  anyone 
who goes to the land will see that it has been marked or fenced, thus 
reducing the possibility of conflict.  Moreover, claims made from a distance 
imply no intent to use the claimed land to benefit society, since the claimant 
has made no investment to that end.  On the other hand, a claim made on-
site implies the claimant will start using the land to produce value for 
society.  Otherwise, he would have no reason to invest in going there and 
marking the land.  For these reasons, if the land were fenced or occupied 
with the plaintiff’s equipment, a court likely would find the situation to be 
materially different from the situation in Nemitz. 
Other countries’ courts, assuming they decide to take jurisdiction over 
the dispute,309 are likely to be even less hospitable to lunar property claims 
than United States courts.  In civil law countries, the court would initially 
have a reason to be open to lunar property rights:  the natural law theory of 
property.310  Under the natural law theory, property rights originate in 
possession, not sovereignty.311  Consequently, the court might initially be 
swayed by the argument that rights in lunar land vest when a person takes 
and signals possession.  However, the court will be confronted with the 
counterargument that the Outer Space Treaty’s Article II non-appropriation 
clause312
European countries’ courts
 rules out private possession.  Even if in a vacuum possession 
would ripen into property rights, the treaty regime exists to prevent that 
progression occurring on the moon.  While the court might consider that a 
private party’s claim may not be subject to Article II, since it only limits 
“national appropriation by claim of sovereignty,” the court will ultimately 
find that argument unconvincing.  Private property claims would be 
considered by civil courts to amount to such “appropriation . . . by any other 
means.”  A court outside the United States likely will find the defendant’s 
argument convincing on this point. 
313 are likely to conclude that “private” 
companies acting on the moon are acting on behalf of the government from 
whose territory the plaintiff launched.  The European notion of “industrial 
policy”314 sees actions by private companies in conjunction with or 
encouraged by the government to be equivalent to actions of those 
governments in space.315
 
 309. An unlikely result. See supra Part III.A.1. 
  This means that, for example, a private company 
which was extracting minerals or water from the moon under contract to 
 310. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 313. A defendant who did not launch from the United States would most likely have 
launched from a European country, Russia, China, or India, since these are the other 
countries with active space programs. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
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supply a United States government-funded scientific research mission 
would be equivalent to the government extracting the resources itself.316  
Consequently, the non-appropriation clause would bar the purported private 
property claims, because it would simply be the government-contractor’s 
“appropriation by other means.”317
The court of a developing country
 
318 is also likely to be convinced that 
the common heritage of mankind doctrine319 is implied in the Outer Space 
Treaty’s Article I.320  Developing countries are especially friendly to the 
common heritage of mankind doctrine because it preserves their right to a 
portion of the profit from outer space resources, even without contributing 
to the extraction.321  Moreover, even if developing countries were not able 
to extract a share of such profits, the common heritage doctrine would give 
them veto power over outer space resource exploitation, thus preserving the 
resources until those countries have developed the wealth and technology to 
compete for the resources’ exploitation on equal footing.322
In addition to any usual avenues of appeal, since lunar property claims 
may be grounded in a set of treaties, one final appeal beyond the appeals to 
domestic courts is available:  the claim can be brought before the ICJ.
  For these 
reasons, a court outside the United States would be unlikely to act to defend 
a private claim to lunar property. 
323
4.  Litigating Lunar Property Claims in the ICJ 
  
The next subsection will discuss the ICJ’s likely line of deliberation in, and 
the likely outcome of, such an appeal. 
The hypothetical lunar property plaintiff faces several difficulties with 
suit in the ICJ.  First, the plaintiff would have to convince his government 
to present the claim to the Launching State of the defendant under the Outer 
Space Treaty.324  The plaintiff’s state may refuse to do so for diplomatic or 
political reasons.  On the other hand, the United States and other wealthy 
countries would have a strong interest in prosecuting a property claim on 
behalf of the large corporations most likely to have such a claim in the first 
place.  Such business organizations provide employment, investment, and 
tax revenue that may be politically important enough to overcome 
countervailing concerns.  Next, the defendant’s Launching State may refuse 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ.325
 
 316. See supra notes 
  The ICJ Statute’s default rule requires state 
parties to a dispute to submit to the court’s jurisdiction, and none of the 
space treaties contain a provision expressly granting jurisdiction to the ICJ.  
110–14 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text. 
 318. A defendant might have launched from a developing country if it is a private 
company looking for a cheap base on Earth. 
 319. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra notes 162, 190 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text; note 215. 
 325. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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Then again, the United States and other wealthy countries can use 
diplomatic pressure to encourage other countries to submit to ICJ 
jurisdiction in a given case. 
Assuming the ICJ does hear the case, the court would have to first decide 
that there is a property right capable of being defended.  The Liability 
Convention’s article VIII(1) provides one avenue.326  Article VIII(1) states 
that “[a] State . . . whose natural or juridical persons suffer damage, may 
present to a launching State a Claim for compensation.”327  The court 
would consider the argument that the defendant’s actions with respect to the 
purported property tortiously damaged the plaintiff.  This damage can be 
measured by the difference between the value of the resources the plaintiff 
was able to extract (if any), and those he would have been able to extract 
but for the defendant’s actions.  On the other hand, the court will reason 
that the Liability Convention is only intended to address tortious injury to 
persons and equipment, not real property.  In other words, the plaintiff 
would be indirectly trying to gain ICJ recognition of private property.  
However, the ICJ would reason that recognizing such a right would be 
contrary to the Outer Space Treaty’s Article II prohibition on such private 
property.  Then again, the ICJ will consider, as discussed in Parts III.A.2 
and 3, that the treaty regime does not rule out private property, but only 
“national appropriation.”328  There might be a “general principle of law” 
whereby possession of un-owned land confers ownership.329
As in most international bodies, developed countries are outnumbered by 
developing countries in the United Nations, and ICJ judges are drawn from 
the member countries of the United Nations.
  If enough 
countries follow this rule, the ICJ may accept it as a “general principle” of 
international law binding upon it.  However, even if the ICJ recognizes such 
a “general principle” of property through first possession, the ICJ likely will 
decide that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty counsels strongly against 
recognizing private lunar property.  Since the language of the treaty is 
ambiguous, the ICJ must look to the intent of the drafters and the policies 
the member states implicitly agreed to when they signed. 
330
B.  Toward a Clearer Regime for Property Rights on the Moon 
  As noted in the preceding 
subsection, developing countries are likely to be inhospitable to private 
property claims to parts of the moon or its resources.  Consequently, an ICJ 
tribunal would likely decide that private property rights in the moon are 
prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty’s Article II. 
As the foregoing discussion elucidates, whether or not property rights 
exist on the moon331
 
 326. See supra notes 
 is not easy to determine.  The best prediction given the 
current state of the law is “probably not.”  This subsection argues that the 
80, 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 328. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra notes 132, 138–42 and accompanying text. 
 330. See supra note 121. 
 331. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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best solution to the lack of clarity in the current legal regime is to establish 
an international agency that will distribute exclusive licenses to exploit 
particular plots of lunar land.  Part III.B.1 argues that the Moon Agreement 
should be supplemented with an implementation agreement that makes it 
palatable to developed countries, similar to the one that made UNCLOS 
successful.332
1.  An International Moon Authority 
  Part III.B.2 suggests guidelines for balancing the interests of 
developing countries with those of developed countries. 
Subsection 5 of the Moon Agreement’s Article 11 commits parties to the 
Agreement to “establish an international regime . . . to govern the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the moon.”333  Such a regime should 
be created as soon as possible to deal with the coming lunar gold rush.334  
The regime should be modeled on the Implementation Agreement that 
revised UNCLOS.335
The Moon Agreement faces the same problem that UNCLOS 
encountered before the Implementation Agreement existed:  the common 
heritage of mankind doctrine.
 
336  The Moon Agreement’s common heritage 
language should be “elaborat[ed] and implement[ed]”337 with an 
international body that issues licenses for exploitation of lunar resources.  
That body should issue licenses subject to limitations negotiated among all 
countries.  This solution mirrors the solution to UNCLOS’s initial failure, 
which was to change the mandate of the ISA, the supervisory body charged 
with overseeing the exploitation of undersea resources.338
The amended Moon Agreement should be implemented with an 
international body charged with procedures acceptable to developed 
countries.
 
339  The procedures should be set forth in a founding document 
for an International Moon Authority (IMA).  For example, the IMA should 
not give member countries a veto over any license.340  The document 
creating the IMA should also rule out any redistribution of the profits from 
any private activity on the moon to poorer countries.341  Conversely, the 
IMA’s founding document should reaffirm the Moon Agreement’s 
prohibition of private property claims on the moon.342  The IMA should be 
sheltered from international political pressure343
 
 332. See supra notes 
 by having a clear rulebook 
188–94 and accompanying text. 
 333. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 11(5); see supra note 88 and accompanying 
text. 
 334. See supra notes 11–19 and accompanying text. 
 335. See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra Part I.D. 
 337. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 338. See supra notes 189–93 and accompanying text. 
 339. This solution would mirror the international approach toward property rights to the 
deep seabed. See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text. 
 340. Cf. supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
 341. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 342. Moon Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 11(3); see supra note 87; cf. supra note 188 
and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra Parts I.C.2, III.A.3. 
1404 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
about when to issue licenses, how many to issue, and what requirements 
applicants must meet.  The IMA should consist of a board of legal 
professionals selected from within the U.N., tasked with approving or 
denying license applications.  The individuals who serve on the board 
should be non-ideological and willing to follow the guidelines contained in 
the IMA’s founding document. 
To gain the assent of most countries, the IMA would have to address the 
main area of tension, balancing the interests of technologically advanced, 
space-faring nations, who can exploit lunar resources imminently, with the 
interests of less-developed nations, who want to preserve lunar resources 
for some future time when they have the capacity to exploit them.344
2.  The Lilliputians Versus Goliath:  How to Balance the Interests 
of Numerous Poor Countries Against Those of a Few Rich Countries 
 
Space-faring nations are necessarily technologically advanced. 
Developing nations, however, generally lack the technological capacity to 
exploit resources in difficult environments such as Antarctica, the deep 
seabed, and the moon.345  Consequently, developed and developing nations 
have contradictory incentives.  On the one hand, developed nations have an 
incentive to extract as much profit from the moon as possible while their 
technological lead over developing nations exists.346
The current regime serves neither side’s interest well.  Developed 
nations’ potential to profit from lunar resources are threatened by the lack 
of clarity over private parties’ claims to lunar land.  Parties who develop 
lunar land cannot even protect their investment from disturbances on 
neighboring land.
  Developing nations, 
on the other hand, have the contrary incentive, to preserve lunar resources 
undisturbed until some future time when they have the technology to 
exploit them. 
347
As with UNCLOS, developed countries have refused to be bound by the 
Moon Agreement’s restrictive regime that effectively prohibits any 
exploitation of lunar resources.
  At the same time, since no space-faring nations have 
agreed to be bound by the Moon Agreement, developing nations’ future 
interest in lunar resources are not protected.  Since private property has not 
been clearly ruled out by treaty, private lunar land grabs by people from 
wealthy countries remain a threat to developing countries’ interests. 
348
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  Bringing the rich countries into an 
international regime such as the IMA proposed by this Note would place 
limits on rich countries’ exploitation of the moon.  Such a regime would 
more adequately protect developing countries’ interests in preserving the 
moon for future exploitation than the current regime. 
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Developing countries should have the right to sell and lease their right of 
access to the moon to private parties who launch from developed countries.  
This would allow the developing countries to share in some of the profits of 
lunar exploitation, but only through the assent of a private party who wishes 
to use that country’s reserve and agrees to pay for it.  At the same time, 
developed countries such as the U.S. would be more likely to accept such 
an arrangement as a “free market” solution.349
Such a regime would also benefit developing countries because their 
citizens could capitalize on the technological reach of richer countries.  
Citizens of developing countries could get financing from rich-country 
banks and launch from a developed country, which would have technology 
sufficiently advanced for launching a trip to the moon.  The citizen’s home 
country, meanwhile, could grant him access to a part of its lunar reserve for 
a nominal fee.  Assuming the venture was granted a license by the IMA, the 
developing country could thus enable its citizen to profit from lunar 
resources right away, without waiting for its technology to catch up. 
 
The international community should act quickly to create a body to 
manage the moon and its resources.  Given all of the competing interests 
involved, the alternative is a regression to primitive mechanisms such as 
first possession, fences, and lawsuits.  If, as is likely, lawsuits prove 
ineffective, violent conflict is probably not far behind.  The international 
community has a chance to prevent a deterioration in mankind’s relations 
with regard to the moon.  That chance should be seized. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a cliché that familiarity breeds contempt.  While that may be an 
overstatement, it is true that as human knowledge of something increases, 
that thing’s romance in the human imagination decreases.  Since people 
first stepped on the surface of the moon, it has become increasingly 
familiar.  Humans have come a long way from the days when the moon was 
merely a mysterious orb in the sky.  Now it is increasingly seen as a source 
of potential profit. 
The current legal regime was created while the afterglow of the first 
direct contact with the moon lingered.  That legal regime consequently 
gives insufficient guidance with respect to the more prosaic problems that 
now face humanity concerning the moon.  If lunar property litigation were 
to happen tomorrow, it would prove messy, expensive, and unpredictable:  
messy because of the strong policy interests on all sides, expensive because 
of the likely international character of the litigation, and unpredictable 
because, as this Note has argued, the law is unsettled.  Some transactional 
lawyers believe their role is to prevent litigation.  Now is the time for the 
international community to act as the transactional lawyer for humanity by 
clarifying the status of lunar property. 
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